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 Abstract 
This dissertation was written as part of the LLM in Transnational and European 
Commercial Law, Banking Law, Arbitration/Mediation at the International Hellenic 
University.  
Deposit insurance and bank resolution interact with each other as alternative or 
complementary mechanisms. Given that a direct pay-off under a deposit guarantee 
scheme will take place only where a failing bank is closed and liquidated and 
depositors have no longer access to their deposits, bank resolution – under the BRRD 
framework –  ensures the continuity of banking services through the organisation of an 
orderly failure, reducing thus the likelihood of a deposit pay-off. 
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I. Introduction 
The banking1 crisis of 2007-09, the most severe and complex the world has faced since 
1929, has undoubtedly left a clear imprint on the global economy.2 The first major 
banking – and further, capital – crisis of the 21st century3 has been attributed to a 
catalogue of manifold reasons, thoroughly analysed and discussed in various reports, 
books and papers.4  
Developments in the market for subprime mortgages5, for instance, were just among 
the triggers – the proximate causes – of the crisis, whereas vulnerabilities in the public 
and private sector contributed to the amplification of the initial shocks.6 Lastra and 
                                               
1 There are two types of crises, banking and financial ones. The former type refers to the money stock 
and threatens the economy as a whole, whereas the latter, even though it may destroy wealth, it does 
not jeopardize the whole economic edifice. See, R. M. Lastra, G. Wood, ‘The Crisis of 2007–09: Nature, 
Causes, and Reactions’, Journal of International Economic Law (2010), online at 
https://academic.oup.com/jiel/article-abstract/13/3/531/874980, accessed 5 January 2019, 531 ff. 
2 The High Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU, Chaired by Jacques de Larosière, Report, 
(Brussels, 25 Feb. 2009) (De Larosière Report), p. 6. 
3 R. M. Lastra, G. Wood, ‘The Crisis of 2007–09: Nature, Causes, and Reactions’, Journal of International 
Economic Law (2010), 531, 534-535. 
4 De Larosière Report, Chapter I; Financial Services Authority, The Turner Review, a Regulatory Response 
to the Global Banking Crisis (Mar. 2009), Chapter I; J. Carmassi et al., Overcoming Too-Big-To-Fail: A 
Regulatory Framework to Limit Moral Hazard and Free Riding in the Financial Sector, Report of the SEPS-
Assonine Task Force on Bank Crisis Resolution (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2010) 
online at http://aei.pitt.edu/14484/1/TFR_Bank_Crisis_Resolution.pdf, accessed 5 January 2019; B. S.  
Bernanke, The Federal Reserve and the Financial Crisis (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013); 
T. Geitner, Stress Test: Reflections on Financial Crises (New York, NY: Broadway Books, 2014); M. 
Schillig, Resolution and Insolvency of Banks and Financial Institutions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2016), paras. 2.02-2.03;  
M. Lastra, G. Wood, ‘The Crisis of 2007–09: Nature, Causes, and Reactions’, Journal of International 
Economic Law (2010), 531, 537 ff.; G. Gorton and A. Metrick, ‘Securitized Banking and the Run on the 
Repo’, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. W15223 (2009), online at 
https://www.moodys.com/microsites/crc2010/papers/gorton_run_on_repo_nov.pdf, accessed 5 
January 2019. 
5 ‘’Securitization and other innovations in mortgage markets led to new loan products with the potential 
to make home ownership easier and more accessible to buyers who could not access credit previously 
through conventional means. These so-called subprime and near-prime mortgage products allowed 
buyers with lower credit scores, smaller downpayments, and/or little documentation of income to 
purchase houses. These new products not only allowed new buyers to access credit, but also made it 
easier for home owners to refinance loans and withdraw cash from houses that had appreciated in 
value.’’ See C. Mayer and K. Pence, ‘Subprime Mortgages: What, Where, and to Whom?’, Finance and 
Economics Discussion Series Divisions of Research & Statistics and Monetary Affairs, Federal Reserve 
Board, Washington D.C. (2008), online at 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2008/200829/200829pap.pdf, accessed 6 January 2019, p. 
1. 
6 B. S. Bernanke, ‘Some Reflections on the Crisis and the Policy Response’ Remarks by Ben S. Bernanke, 
Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System at the Conference on  
 
 
  -2- 
Wood note that macroeconomic imbalances along with loose monetary policies, 
characterised by easy money and cheap credit, gaps and inadequate rules in the 
regulatory structure combined with failures of supervision were mainly attributed to 
authorities (governments, regulators, central bankers).7  
Part of the blame was further put on the market participants.8 Financial innovation, 
including extremely complex products and techniques (asset-backed securities) 
gradually led banks to a more profitable model compared to the traditional deposit-
taking and lending business, namely, the securitisation9 (‘originate-to-distribute’ 
model10) and trading in securities and derivatives markets. As a result, the unregulated 
market for over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives grew and the so-called shadow banking 
system expanded. 11   
Comprised of a set of institutions and markets, which, on the one hand, perform 
traditional banking functions but, on the other, do so outside the traditional system of 
regulated depository institutions12, the shadow banking system and its components13 
(securitization vehicles, asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) conduits, money 
                                                                                                                                         
“Rethinking Finance: Perspectives on the Crisis”, Presented by the Russell Sage Foundation and The 
Century Foundation New York, New York (13 April 2012), online at 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/files/bernanke20120413a.pdf, accessed 4 January 
2019, p. 1.  
7 R. M. Lastra, G. Wood, ‘The Crisis of 2007–09: Nature, Causes, and Reactions’, Journal of International 
Economic Law (2010), 531, 537-539. 
8 ibid. P. 538. 
9 ‘’Securitisation is part of structured finance. It is a financing technique by which homogeneous income-
generating assets − which on their own may be difficult to trade − are pooled and sold to a specially 
created third party, which uses them as collateral to issue securities and sell them in financial markets.  
Transactions within this process involve several parties and range from relatively simple and clear to 
more complex and opaque. Although securitisation was not directly responsible for the 2008 financial 
crisis, it contributed to it and played a role in its amplification.’’ 
See A. Delivorias, ‘Understanding Securitisation: Background-Benefits-Risks’,  
European Parliamentary Research Service (Oct. 2015), online at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2015/569017/EPRS_IDA%282015%29569017_E
N.pdf, accessed 6 January 2019, p. 4. 
10 See The Turner Review, p. 16.  
11 M. Schillig, Resolution and Insolvency of Banks and Financial Institutions (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2016), para. 2.02; See G.B. Gorton and A. Metrick, ‘Regulating the Shadow Banking System’, 
(October 2010), online at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1676947, accessed 7 
January 2019, p. 6. 
12 See S. L. Schwarzc, ‘Regulating Shadow Banking’ (2012) 31 Review of Banking and Financial Law, 
online at 
https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3121&context=faculty_scholarship, 
accessed 7 January 2019, 619, 623 ff.; G.B. Gorton and A. Metrick, ‘Regulating the Shadow Banking 
System’, p. 15 ff. 
13 See N. Roubini, ‘The Shadow Banking System is unravelling’, online at 
https://www.ft.com/content/622acc9e-87f1-11dd-b114-0000779fd18c, accessed 7 January 2019, p. 2  
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market mutual funds, markets for repurchase agreements (repos), hedge funds, 
private equity groups, broker dealers, mortgage companies) played  a crucial role14 on 
the world stage of finance before the crisis.15  
Furthermore, corporate governance failures combined with inadequate risk 
management structures and excessive leverage amplified through human greed and 
short-term interests and profits should also be mentioned as contributing factors that 
fuelled the boom.16 
From this crisis evolved for some euro-area peripheral countries a sovereign debt crisis, 
mainly due to the sovereign – bank diabolic loop, since the significant amount of state 
aid required to support banks resulted in the rapid increase of the public debt, 
rendering banks and sovereigns highly interconnected.17 
As the aforementioned brief summary of the generally accepted causes together with 
the touch-paper of the crisis, the subsequent collapse of Lehman Brothers18, reveal,  
the need for a regulatory and supervisory reform agenda, including bank resolution 
frameworks,  to be set both at international and European level was more than urgent. 
In the aftermath of the crisis, international institutions and organizations (structures 
formed through political processes, like G20, standard-setters, like the Financial 
Stability Board (FSB)19 and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BSBC) and 
monitoring authorities, like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank 
Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP))20 have committed to reform and 
                                               
14 The crisis was caused due to a ‘run on repo’. See G.B. Gorton and A. Metrick, ‘Regulating the Shadow 
Banking System’, (October 2010), p. 15. 
15 B. S. Bernanke, ‘Some Reflections on the Crisis and the Policy Response’ Remarks by Ben S. Bernanke, 
Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System at the Conference on  
“Rethinking Finance: Perspectives on the Crisis”, Presented by the Russell Sage Foundation and The 
Century Foundation New York, New York (13 April 2012), p. 2.  
16 R. M. Lastra, G. Wood, ‘The Crisis of 2007–09: Nature, Causes, and Reactions’,  
Journal of International Economic Law (2010), 531, 541-543. 
17 M. Schillig, Resolution and Insolvency of Banks and Financial Institutions (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2016), para. 2.04;  
18 It is argued that the poor planning of the bankruptcy process resulted in losses that could have been 
avoided in the event that an orderly liquidation process was in place. See M. J. Fleming and A. Sarkar, 
The Failure Resolution of Lehman Brothers, FRBNY, Economic Policy Review (Dec. 2014), online at 
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/epr/2014/1412flem.pdf, accessed 10 
January 2019, p. 175ff. 
19 The Financial Stability Forum (FSF), established in 1999, was the predecessor of the FSB. 
http://www.fsb.org/history/. 
20 D. W. Arner and R. P. Buckley, ‘Redesigning the Architecture of the Global Financial System’ 
(December 2010), Melbourne Journal of International Law, Vol. 11, No. 2, 2010, online at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1758470, accessed 10 January 2019, 1, 17-20. 
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enhance the national supervisory frameworks as well as to strengthen individual 
institutions with reference to their capital base and resolvability, and to improve the 
financial market infrastructure.21  
Tackling the issue of ailing banks without endangering the stability of the global 
financial system was undoubtedly among the priorities of the above-mentioned 
institutions.22 Their efforts towards a stable and sound regime for coping with failed 
banks was marked with the adoption by the Financial Stability Board’s (FSB) of the  Key 
Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions23, which was 
subsequently endorsed by the G20 Leaders at the Cannes Summit24.  Resolving failing 
financial institutions in an orderly manner avoiding taxpayers’ exposure to the losses 
and severe systemic disruption while maintaining their vital economic functions was 
the rationale of the KA.25  
At the European level, taking into consideration both the global and Eurozone crisis, 
the package of reforms in respect of the financial and banking sector dealt with the 
shortcomings of the macro- and microprudential supervision26 in line with the 
recommendations of the De Larosière27 Report.28  
                                               
21 M. Schillig, Resolution and Insolvency of Banks and Financial Institutions (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2016), para. 2.06;  
22 G20, Leader’s Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit, September 24-25, 2009, online at 
https://www.bmjv.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/G20/G20%20Leaders's%20Statement%20(Pittsburgh
%20Summit).pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2, accessed 10 January 2019, 1,9; International Monetary 
Fund and the World Bank, An Overview of the Legal, Institutional and Regulatory Framework for Bank 
Insolvency, (April 2009), online at https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2009/041709.pdf, accessed 
10 January 2019; Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Report and Recommendations of the Cross-
border Bank Resolution Group, (March 2010), online at https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs169.pdf, 
accessed 10 January 2019; International Monetary Fund, Resolution of Cross-Border Banks—A Proposed 
Framework for Enhanced Coordination (June 2010), online at 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2010/061110.pdf, accessed 10 January 2019. 
23 Financial Stability Board, Key Attributes (KA) of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions 
(October 2011). The new version was adopted in October 2014. Online at http://www.fsb.org/wp-
content/uploads/r_141015.pdf, accessed 10 January 2019. 
24 ‘‘(...) a new international standard for resolution regimes’’: Communiqué G20 Leaders Summit – 
Cannes – 3-4 November 2011. 
25 M. Lopez-Escudero ‘EU Banking Union and International Financial Law’, in: Luis Hinojosa and Jose 
Beneyto (eds), European Banking Union: The New Regime (Alphen aan den Rijn, The Netherlands: 
Kluwer Law International, 2015), Chapter 12, p. 203. 
26 Establishment of the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and European System of Financial 
Supervisors (ESFS), co-ordinated by the new European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs): Regulation (EU) 
No 1092/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24  November 2010 on European Union 
macro-prudential oversight of the financial system and establishing a European Systemic Risk Board; 
Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 
establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority). 
27 De Larosière Report, Chapters III-IV. 
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Moreover, implementing the Basel III capital requirements29 through the CRR/CRD IV30 
has been of utmost importance in the context of EU banking reform.  
With regard to bank resolution, the EU Commission laid out an extensive plan for a 
legal framework in order for authorities to be able to manage effectively crises in the 
financial sector.31 It is the Directive 2014/59/EU, which establishes a framework for the 
recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms (BRRD)32. Its 
proposals to amend the aforementioned Directive (BRRD II) presented the European 
Commission in November 2016 (reform package)33, aiming to deal with remaining 
weaknesses of the financial system and to implement the outstanding and by that time 
finalized new global standards.34  
Among the regulatory and supervisory reforms that have taken place since the 
outbreak of the banking crisis should also be numbered the Deposit Guarantee 
Schemes Directive (recast)35. The original Directive of Deposit Guarantee Schemes 
                                                                                                                                         
28 M. Schillig, Resolution and Insolvency of Banks and Financial Institutions (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2016), paras. 2.07-2.27. 
29 BSBC, Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems (June 
2011), online at https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf, accessed 11 January 2019. 
30 Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on 
prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms, OJ L 176, 27.6.2013 (CRR); 
DIRECTIVE 2013/36/EU OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 26 June 2013 on 
access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and 
investment firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC, 
OJ L 176, 27.6.2013 (CRD IV). 
31 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the European Central Bank: an EU 
framework for crisis management in the financial sector, COM (2010) 579 final.  
32 Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a 
framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending 
Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 
2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) 
No 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council, OJ L 173, 12.6.2014. 
33 COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT IMPACT ASSESSMENT, Proposal amending: - Regulation 
(EU) No 575/2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms; - Directive 
2013/36/EU on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit 
institutions and investment firms; - Directive 2014/59/EU establishing a framework for the recovery and 
resolution of credit institutions and investment firms; - Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the 
resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution 
Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund, Brussels, 23.11.2016 SWD(2016) 377 final. 
34 European Commission, Frequently asked questions: Capital requirements (CRR/CRD IV) and resolution 
framework (BRRD/SRM) amendments, Brussels 23 November 2016. 
35 Directive 2014/49/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on deposit 
guarantee schemes, OJ L 173, 12.6.2014. 
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(DGSD)36 was rendered obsolete and its provisions on minimum harmonization 
provided for significant differences among the (national) Deposit Guarantee Schemes 
(DGS) as regards the level of coverage, the scope of covered depositors and products 
and the payout delay.  
Thus, the review of the DGSD was essential for the harmonisation and simplification of 
the Directive in order to improve protection of deposits, maintain depositor 
confidence and strengthen the safety net.37 The coverage of national Deposit 
Guarantee Schemes has now been raised to a harmonised level of €100,000 per 
depositor.38 
Notwithstanding the reform of the EU regulatory framework and the existing 
coordination between supervisors, the European Commission called ‘’for a Banking 
Union to place the banking sector on a more sound footing and restore confidence in 
the Euro as part of a longer term vision for economic and fiscal integration. Shifting the 
supervision of banks to the European level is a key part of this process, which must 
subsequently be combined with other steps, such as a common system for deposit 
protection and integrated bank crisis management.’’.39 The Banking Union currently 
consists of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM)40 and the Single Resolution 
Mechanism (SRM)41. Its third Pillar, the European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS)42, is 
yet to be completed. 
 
                                               
36 Directive 94/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 1994 on deposit-
guarantee-schemes, OJ L135/5, 31 May 1994. 
37 European Commission, Frequently asked questions: Deposit Guarantee Schemes, Brussels 15 April 
2014. 
38 Recast DGSD, Art. 6. 
39 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council: A Roadmap towards a Banking Union, COM (2012) 510 final. 
40 Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European 
Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions, OJ EU 
29.10.2013 L287/63.  
41 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014 
establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain 
investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and 
amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, OJ EU L225/1 30.07.2014; See fn. 34. 
42 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 
806/2014 in order to establish a European Deposit Insurance Scheme, COM (2015) 586 final; 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Central 
Bank, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions "Towards the 
completion of the Banking Union", COM (2015) 587 final, 5-8. 
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Therefore, the dissertation will examine the latest reforms in the EU on the creation of 
a harmonised framework for a recovery and resolution of credit institutions. 
Moreover, it will look at the European Banking Union with a view to analysing the 
Single Resolution Mechanism and its interaction with the third and yet to be 
completed Pillar, a European Deposit Insurance Scheme. The role of a Deposit 
Protection Scheme in resolution will be explored and the current developments at EU 
level will be compared with those in the US, where an established Resolution and 
Deposit Protection Regime has been in place. 
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II. The EU Resolution Framework 
When a bank fails, the money has gone. Obvious is only the fact that someone has to 
bear the losses, be it the taxpayers, the bank’s shareholders, its depositors or other 
creditors. Less obvious, though, is the answer to the question of ‘’who pays?’’, taking 
into consideration that large and interconnected banks operate in a global and 
internationally integrated financial system, both within and beyond national borders.43 
In fact, in the years that preceded the crisis some banks were deemed too big, too 
interconnected or too complex to be closed or go bankrupt.44  
Since failure was not an option, public support was required and the taxpayers had to 
step in (bail-out), rescuing most failed large banks.45 As Cunliffe notes, the exception of 
Lehman Brothers, in the case of which the US Government chose not to proceed to a 
bail-out, and its subsequent disorderly insolvency proved that handling effectively the 
failure of very large financial institutions could not be taken for granted, even for the 
oldest and most advanced bank resolution regime.46  
The game-changing regulation reducing the probability as well as the impact of failure 
came within the context of the international regulatory reforms. The Financial Stability 
Board’s Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions (KA) 
constitute the new harmonised international standard for resolution regimes. Despite 
focusing on global systemically important banks (G-SIBs), they still provide guidance to 
jurisdictions that are amending national resolution regimes.47 Their translation into EU 
law has been achieved through two pieces of legislation, namely the BRRD and the 
                                               
43 J. Cunliffe, ‘Ending Too-Big-to-Fail: How Best to Deal with Failed Large Banks’, European Economy – 
Banks, Regulation and the Real Sector (Dec. 2016), 59, 59 – 60. 
44 R. M. Lastra, G. Wood, ‘The Crisis of 2007–09: Nature, Causes, and Reactions’,  
Journal of International Economic Law (2010), 531, 539; Following the taxpayer bail-out of Continental 
Illinois in 1984, which cost over 1 billion Dollars, the then Comptroller of the Currency coined the phrase 
‘’too-big-to-fail’’ to describe the largest 11 banks in the US. See J. Cunliffe, ‘Ending Too-Big-to-Fail: How 
Best to Deal with Failed Large Banks’, European Economy – Banks, Regulation and the Real Sector 
(December 2016), 59, 62.  
45 World Bank Group, ‘Understanding Bank Recovery and Resolution in the EU: a Guidebook to the 
BRRD’ (April 2017), online at http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/609571482207234996/FinSAC-BRRD-
Guidebook.pdf, accessed 16 January 2019, p. 5. 
46J. Cunliffe, ‘Ending Too-Big-to-Fail: How Best to Deal with Failed Large Banks’, European Economy – 
Banks, Regulation and the Real Sector (Dec. 2016), 59, 63.  
47 World Bank Group, ‘‘Understanding Bank Recovery and Resolution in the EU: a Guidebook to the 
BRRD’’ (April 2017), p. 5. 
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SRM Regulation.48 Although they are complementary, they will be discussed 
separately, since the Single Resolution Mechanism forms part of the EU Banking 
Union.49 
A. The Rationale behind the Resolution Regimes – the Route towards the BRRD 
Prior to the crisis, in most European countries bank insolvency would be treated under 
the general rules of insolvency law (lex generalis), whereas special rules (lex specialis) 
would apply only where this was explicitly provided for by the respective banking 
law.50 By contrast to the majority of the European legislations, the US approach 
exempts commercial banks from the corporate bankruptcy code so that the 
declaration and resolution of bank insolvencies are governed by a special Regime, the 
Federal Insurance Deposit Act.51 
When the crisis hit in Europe, normal insolvency52 proceedings proved to be 
inadequate to deal with bank failures, taking into account the specificity53 of these 
financial institutions and their role within the financial sector and society. Hüpkes 
explains that the functions that banks perform (for instance, collection of deposits 
from private persons and businesses, provision of loans to households and businesses) 
on the basis of public trust are crucial for the health of a country’s economy. 54  Loss of 
confidence in them would lead to massive withdrawals55 of funds by depositors and 
creditors, resulting in their failure with possible spillover effects on other banks across 
                                               
48 M. Lopez-Escudero ‘EU Banking Union and International Financial Law’, in: Luis Hinojosa and Jose 
Beneyto (eds), European Banking Union: The New Regime (Alphen aan den Rijn, The Netherlands: 
Kluwer Law International, 2015), Chapter 12, p. 204.  
49 See Chapter IV. 
50 E.  Hüpkes, ‘Insolvency – Why a Special Regime for Banks?’, CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN MONETARY 
AND FINANCIAL LAW, Vol. 3, International Monetary Fund (Washington DC, 2003). Online 
at https://ssrn.com/abstract=1751644, accessed 18 January 2019, 6. 
51 See R. R. Bliss and G.G. Kaufman, ‘U.S. Corporate and Bank Insolvency Regimes: An Economic 
Comparison and Evaluation’ (January 2006), FRB of Chicago Working Paper No. 2006-01, online 
at https://ssrn.com/abstract=878355 , 1; See also R.R. Bliss, ‘Multiple regulators  and insolvency 
regimes: Obstacles to efficient supervision and resolution’, forthcoming in D. Mayes and G. Woods (eds), 
The Structure of Financial Regulation , 26 May 2005), 1, 23-24. 
52 ‘’The definition of insolvency as regards banking is often controversial, because the line of 
demarcation between illiquidity and insolvency is not always clear’’. See R.M. Lastra, ‘Cross-border Bank 
Insolvency’, Law in Transition online (October 2007) online at http://www.ebrd.com/documents/legal-
reform/law-in-transition-online-2007-making-an-insolvency-system-work.pdf?blobnocache=true, 
accessed 20 January 2019, 43, 46. 
53 Ibid. 43-44. 
54 E.  Hüpkes, ‘Insolvency – Why a Special Regime for Banks?’, CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN MONETARY 
AND FINANCIAL LAW, Vol. 3, International Monetary Fund (Washington DC, 2003, 3. 
55 See ‘Northern Rock Withdrawals at £2bn’, BBC News (Sept. 16, 2007, 21:37 GTM), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6997264.stm. 
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the globe – due to their high interconnectedness – destabilising the whole financial 
system.56  
Contrary to normal insolvency proceedings, the objective of which is to maximize the 
value of the assets of the failed firm in the interest of its creditors, the resolution aims 
at a rapid and decisive response to a failing or likely to fail bank in order to restore it 
back to viability, while maintaining financial stability through the protection of its 
critical functions and minimizing losses for society. In terms of allocation of losses to 
shareholders and creditors, it ensures similar results to those of normal insolvency 
proceedings. Parts of the institution that are considered to be less critical will be 
allowed to fail in an orderly way, according to the general insolvency rules.57 
Furthermore, in the absence of robust resolution regimes the fiscal cost of supporting 
financial institutions in distress was raised at extremely high levels.58 Gordon and Ringe 
stress that uncoordinated and costly bailouts59 characterized the European responses 
to failing banks during the banking crisis, until the U.K. first introduced a special 
resolution scheme60. Gradually, Member States started adopting similar measures, 
which varied, however, significantly as regards speed and priorities.61 Consequently, 
each Member State was concerned with itself, national regulators showed forbearance 
towards their own banks, while the high interconnectedness between States and their 
banks resulted in the expansion of their sovereign debt.62  
As Mario Draghi underlined, a common resolution scheme ‘’would ensure timely and 
impartial decision making focused on the European dimension, would credibly pursue 
                                               
56 European Commission, Frequently Asked Questions, EU Bank Recovery and  Resolution Directive, 
Press Release (15 April 2014) online at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-
297_en.htm?locale=en, accessed 15 January 2019; See also J. Armour, ‘Making Bank Resolution 
Credible’, Law Working Paper No. 244/2014 (February 11, 2014). European Corporate Governance 
Institute (ECGI), online at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2393998, accessed 8 December 2018, 1, 3-5. 
57 European Commission, FAQ, EU Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive. 
58 M. Čihák and E. Nier, ‘The Need for Special Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions—The Case of 
the European Union’, IMF Working Paper (September 2009), online at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1486518, accessed 19 January 2019, p. 3. 
59 Ibid., p. 23: The Case of the Benelux-based Fortis Bank. 
60 Banking Act 2009, UK. See J. Armour, ‘Bank Resolution Regimes: Designing the Right Model?’ Banking 
and Financial Services Law Association (2010), online at http://bfsla.org/wp-
content/uploads/papers/2010/Bank%20Resolution%20Regimes%20-
%20Designing%20the%20Right%20Model%20-%20Armour.pdf, accessed 8 December 2018, 1, 13ff. 
61 J. N. Gordon and W.G. Ringe, ‘Bank Resolution in the European Banking Union: A Transatlantic 
Perspective on what it would take’, Columbia Law Review, Vol. 115 (2015), online at 
https://columbialawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Gordon-Ringe.pdf, accessed 8 December 
2018, 1297, 1332-1336. 
62 Ibid., 1336-1337. 
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the least cost resolution strategy, assessing possible cross-border spillover effects and 
systemic concerns, and would help break the vicious bank-sovereign nexus. (…) The 
adoption of the proposed Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive is an urgently 
needed step towards a strong European resolution framework.’’63 
      B. The BRRD 
The BRRD constitutes a harmonised regime, providing national authorities with a 
minimum set of resolution tools and powers.64 At the same time, it leaves Member 
States discretion as regards the design of the respective resolution regime, so that it 
better fits their own economic circumstances and domestic legal frameworks, provided 
that the discretionary measures conform to the principles and objectives set out in the 
Directive.65 
This set of resolution tools and powers is deemed as an alternative to the national 
insolvency law arsenal, allowing resolution authorities to intervene rapidly and 
decisively in order to maintain vital services and to avoid contagion.66 Once the 
resolution authority has decided to resolve a failing institution, normal insolvency 
proceedings are excluded, save for the event that they need to be combined with 
resolution tools.67 
1. Overview 
Adopted by the European Parliament on 15 May and entered into force on 2 July 2014, 
the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive required transposition into Member 
States’ national law by the end of the same year, except for the bail-in tool provisions, 
which became effective as of 1 January 2016.68 
                                               
63 Mario Draghi, President of the ECB, Introductory Statement at the Hearing of the Committee on 
Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament (18 February 2013); BRRD, Preamble, 
Recital 9: ‘’The absence of common conditions, powers and processes for the resolution of institutions is 
likely to constitute a barrier to the smooth operation of the internal market.’’ 
64 BRRD, Preamble, Recital 44. 
65 N. Kleftouri, Deposit Protection and Bank Resolution, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), para. 
8.21. 
66 M. Schillig, Resolution and Insolvency of Banks and Financial Institutions (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2016), para. 1.13. 
67 BRRD, Preamble, Recital (44). 
68 BRRD Arts. 130(1), 131.  
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Consistent with the objective of implicit coordination via regulatory harmonisation 
within the EU,69 the BRRD applies to those institutions that are subject to the 
prudential supervision and regulatory capital requirements provisions in the EU Capital 
Requirements Directive (CRD IV), namely, credit institutions and investment firms with 
an initial capital of €730,000, as well as financial holding companies established in the 
Union. Financial institutions that are subsidiaries of the above-mentioned categories 
and covered by the supervision of the parent undertaking on a consolidated basis, 
according to the provisions of the CRR, are also included in the scope of the Directive.70  
The Directive further stipulates that Member States are required to designate one or, 
exceptionally, more resolution authorities that are empowered to apply the resolution 
tools and powers.71 National central banks, competent ministries or other public 
administrative authorities may be designated as resolution authorities. Exceptionally, 
this role may also be played by the supervisory authorities for the purposes of CRR and 
CRD IV, on condition that adequate structural arrangements are in place to ensure 
operational independence and avoid conflicts of interest between these two 
functions.72 
2. The BRRD Pillars 
The BRRD resolution regime is based on three pillars. In particular, these are Recovery 
and Resolution Planning, Early Intervention and Resolution. 
a) Recovery and Resolution Planning 
Serving both as a preparative and as a preventive tool, it is expected that Recovery and 
Resolution Planning will significantly improve supervision, especially of systemically 
important institutions and groups, which should anticipate some of the spillover costs 
in the event of their failure and thus make an effort to reduce their risk exposure.73 
                                               
69 María J. Nieto, ‘Regulatory Coordination in the Banking Union’, in: Luis Hinojosa and Jose Beneyto 
(eds), European Banking Union: The New Regime (Alphen aan den Rijn, The Netherlands: Kluwer Law 
International, 2015), Chapter 7, p. 88. 
70 BRRD Art. 1(1).  
71 BRRD, Art. 3. 
72 BRRD, Art. 3(3). 
73 M. Schillig, Resolution and Insolvency of Banks and Financial Institutions (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2016), para. 7.04. 
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The Directive provides that each institution that is not part of a group subject to 
consolidated supervision is required to draw up and maintain a recovery plan, setting 
out the measures the institution needs to take in order to restore its financial position 
in the event of a significant deterioration of its financial situation.74 Furthermore, 
competent authorities must ensure that institutions update their recovery plans at 
least annually or after a change to the legal or organisational structure of the 
institution, its business or its financial situation, which could have a material effect on 
or necessitates a change to the recovery plan.75 With regard to the assessment of the 
plan, the competent authorities are required to review and assess its content within six 
months of their submission.76  
Resolution Planning is drawn by resolution authorities and not the institutions 
themselves, as was the previous case of Recovery Planning. This process better 
prepares for future crisis situations, since it assesses the significance of a bank focusing 
on its critical functions and the likelihood of implications in the event of a failure.77 It 
starts with an assessment78 of whether liquidation under normal insolvency 
proceedings is credible and feasible. If resolution does not seem to be necessary or 
justified in the public interest and the failure of the institution would not have 
significant adverse consequences for the financial system, resolution tools are not 
available. Thus, the institution is deemed to be resolvable through liquidation and 
simplified obligations for drawing up a resolution plan would apply instead. Is a wind 
down not feasible, a resolution strategy will be identified and a ‘’full’’ resolution plan 
will be required.79 
After consulting the supervisor, the resolution authority must draw up a resolution 
plan for each institution that is not covered by consolidated supervision, providing for 
the actions that the resolution authority may take where the institution meets the 
conditions for resolution.80  
                                               
74 BRRD, Art. 5(1). 
75 BRRD, Art. 5(2). 
76 BRRD, Art. 6(1), (2). 
77 G. Merc ‘Resolution Planning’ in World Bank Group, Understanding Bank Recovery and Resolution in 
the EU: a Guidebook to the BRRD (April 2017), Chapter 10a, p. 73.  
78 BRRD, Art. 15. 
79 Ibid., p . 75.  
80 BRRD, Art. 10(1). 
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Resolution planning is not a one- off but a dynamic process aligned with changing 
business and fluctuating financial markets.81 That means, resolution plans must be 
reviewed and, where appropriate, updated at least annually, should material changes 
take place.82 This may further require the assistance of the institutions.83  
Moreover, it is required that the resolution authority identifies any material 
impediments to resolvability and, where necessary and proportionate, presents 
relevant actions for their removal.84 In order to achieve this goal, the Directive 
provides the resolution authority with broad powers. More precisely, among others, it 
has the power to require the institution to revise any intragroup financing agreements 
or review the absence thereof, or draw up service agreement to cover the provision of 
critical functions, to require the institution to limit its maximum individual and 
aggregate exposures, to restrict the development of new or existing business lines or 
sale of new or existing products, to require changes to legal or operational structures 
of the institution or any group entity etc.85 
b) Early Intervention 
In an attempt to enhance the supervisory framework in particular with reference to 
systemically important financial institutions, the FSB recommended that all national 
supervisors should have the powers to identify risks early and intervene in order to 
prevent unsound practices and take appropriate countermeasures to safeguard against 
systemic risks.86 Accordingly, the BRRD gives significant powers to the supervisors, not 
the resolution authority, to intervene at an early stage before any financial problems 
that the institution may face escalate.87 A ‘’rapidly deteriorating financial condition’’, 
including a deteriorating liquidity situation, an increasing level of coverage, an increase 
                                               
81 G. Merc ‘Resolution Planning’ in World Bank Group, Understanding Bank Recovery and Resolution in 
the EU: a Guidebook to the BRRD (April 2017), Chapter 10a, p. 76. 
82 BRRD, Art. 10(6). 
83 BRRD, Art. 10(5). 
84 BRRD, Art. 10(2). 
85 BRRD, Art. 17(5). 
86FSB, Reducing the moral hazard posed by systemically important financial institutions, 
Recommendations and Time Lines (20 October 2010), online at http://www.fsb.org/wp-
content/uploads/r_101111a.pdf?page_moved=1, accessed 23 January 2019, p. 9. 
87 BRRD, Art. 27. 
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of non-performing loan (NPL) portfolios or a concentration of exposures, constitutes 
the trigger for early intervention measures. 88   
The Directive enables the supervisors to require the management body of an 
institution to implement the arrangements and measures set out in the recovery plan. 
Furthermore, they may require the management body to address any identified 
problems and, in case it does not comply with this requirement, to convene a meeting 
of shareholders. What is more, some stronger measures are also available to the 
supervisors, such as the power to require changes to the legal or operational 
structures of the institution as well as the removal or replacement of one or some of 
the members of the management body, if these are considered to be unfit to perform 
their duties.89  
Where replacement of the management body is deemed to be insufficient to remedy 
the situation, supervisors may appoint one or more temporary administrators to the 
institution either to replace or work temporarily with the management body. The 
appointment must be made public and not last more than a year. The role and the 
powers of the temporary administrator must be specified by the supervisor at the time 
of the appointment. 90 
c) Resolution 
Notwithstanding the aforementioned preparative and preventive tools, some 
institutions will inevitably fail.91 Provided that the conditions for resolution have been 
met, the resolution authority will then apply the resolution tools and powers accorded 
to it by the Directive, taking into consideration the objectives of the BRRD, explicitly 
defined in law.  
 
(1) Objectives – General Principles – Conditions  
The foremost objective of the BRRD resolution is to ensure that a failing bank can be 
resolved rapidly and with minimal risk to financial stability. In other words, a bank 
                                               
88 BRRD, Art. 27(1). 
89 BRRD, Arts. 27(1)(d), (g), Art. 28.  
90 BRRD, Art. 29(1)-(3), (7). 
91 M. Schillig, Resolution and Insolvency of Banks and Financial Institutions (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2016), para. 9.01. 
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resolution should not entail any negative impacts on the real economy nor recourse to 
taxpayers’ money (bail-in instead of bail-out).92  
The BRRD objectives are of equal importance93 and they must be balanced by the 
resolution authority, according to the nature and circumstances of each case. More 
precisely, resolution authorities must aim to ensure the continuity of critical functions; 
to avoid a significant adverse effect on the financial system, in particular by preventing 
contagion, including to market infrastructures, and by maintaining market discipline; 
and to protect public funds, insured depositors and insured investors, as well as client 
funds and client assets.94 The Directive further stipulates that, when pursuing the 
above objectives, the resolution authority must seek to minimise the cost of resolution 
and avoid destruction of value, unless necessary to achieve the resolution  
objectives.95 
Moreover, resolution action must take place in tune with a host of general principles of 
resolution. Indicatively, the shareholders of the institution under resolution are the 
first to bear losses, creditors of the institution under resolution bear losses after the 
shareholders, in accordance with the creditor hierarchy, as specified under  the BRRD 
and national insolvency law, management body and senior management of the 
institution under resolution are replaced, natural and legal persons are made liable for 
their responsibility for the failure of the institution etc.96 
The Directive stipulates that resolution action must be initiated, only in those cases in 
which three specific conditions are cumulatively met. First, it must be determined that 
the institution is failing or likely to fail. Second, there must no reasonable prospect that 
alternative private sector measures would prevent the failure. Third, resolution action 
must be in the public interest.97  
An institution is considered to be failing or likely to fail, if it infringes the requirements 
for continuing authorisation in a way that would justify the withdrawal of the 
authorisation by the competent authority or its liabilities exceed the assets (‘’balance 
                                               
92 D. Freudenthaler, ‘The BRRD – An overview of its scope, objectives, powers and tools’ in World Bank 
Group, Understanding Bank Recovery and Resolution in the EU: a Guidebook to the BRRD (April 2017), 
Chapter 3, p. 31.   
93 BRRD, Art. 31(3). 
94 BRRD, Art. 31(1), (2). 
95 BRRD, Art. 31(2). 
96 BRRD, Art. 34. 
97 BRRD, Art. 32 (1). 
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sheet’’ insolvency) or it is unable to pay its debts as they fall due or extraordinary 
public support is required.98 The European Banking Authority, which has a key role in 
resolution by issuing guidelines and implementing technical standards,99  stresses that 
the analysis of these objective elements should remain an expert judgment and that in 
most cases, several factors rather than simply one would determine that an institution 
is failing and, thus, trigger resolution.100 
Alternative private sector measures include supervisory action, early intervention or 
the write-down or conversion of capital instruments and measures in the form of an 
intervention by an Institutional Protection Scheme (IPS) or deposit insurance 
fund.101 
With regard to the public interest test, a resolution action should be necessary and 
proportionate to one or more of the resolution objectives and winding up of the 
institution under normal insolvency proceedings would not meet those resolution 
objectives to the same extent.102 This criterion draws a comparison between these two 
regimes and reveals that insolvency proceedings are not edged out by resolution. 
Rather, it makes clear that in the event of a bank failure a case-by-case assessment is 
required in order to determine whether resolution or insolvency proceedings are to be 
initiated.103 
Since the trigger of resolution is likely to affect the fundamental rights of shareholders 
and creditors, such as the right to property or to a fair trial,104 a clear objective would 
be necessary to justify any interference with these rights. Through the principle that no 
creditor should be worse off than in liquidation (NCWOL)105, the BRRD ensures that no 
                                               
98 BRRD, Art. 32 (4). 
99 N. Kleftouri, Deposit Protection and Bank Resolution, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), paras. 
8.50-8.52; T. Huertas,  
100 EBA, Final Report, ‘Guidelines on the interpretation of the different circumstances when an 
institution shall be considered as failing or likely to fail under Article 32(6) of Directive 2014/59/EU’ (26 
May 2015), online at https://eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/1085517/EBA-GL-2015-
07+GL+on+failing+or+likely+to+fail.pdf, accessed 24 January 2015,p. 12, paras. 15-17. 
101 M. Schillig, Resolution and Insolvency of Banks and Financial Institutions (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2016), para. 9.13. 
102 BRRD, Art. 32 (5). 
103 Deutsche Bundesbank, ‘Europe’s new recovery and resolution regime for credit institutions’, Monthly 
Report, June 2014, 31, 37. 
104 Arts. 17 and 47, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000/C 364/01), 18 
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creditor incurs a loss greater than if the institutions had gone into liquidation.106 
Whether the winding up of an institution under normal insolvency proceedings would 
meet the BRRD resolution objectives to the same extent, is rather challenging to be 
assessed ex-ante and under time pressure. Thus, resolution authorities may use the 
discretion provided by this rather abstract definition of public interest and be inclined 
to determine that their resolution actions are justified in the public interest. 107 
(2) Resolution Tools 
The insulation of impaired assets before their failure spreads to other parts could 
render the financial system more resilient, preventing a downward spiral of asset 
prices and limiting the impact on consumers and businesses by maintaining critical 
functions. Transfers of viable parts of a failing institution’s business to a private sector 
purchaser or to a bridge bank along with the separation of performing assets from the 
non-performing (‘good bank/bad bank’ model) and bail-in constitute the set of tools108, 
which the resolution authorities can deploy in order to achieve the resolution 
objectives.109 
(a) Sale-of-business-tool 
According to the sale-of-business-tool, a business, or parts of it, can easily and quickly 
be transferred to a private sector purchaser through the sale of its assets, rights, or 
liabilities.110 This may take place in the form of a traditional merger or acquisition, 
where a healthy bank is willing to recapitalise and manage the failed bank.111  
 
(b) Bridge institution tool 
In the absence of such a recipient in the market, the resolution authority has the 
power under the BRRD to ‘’bridge time’’ until a private sector solution is found through 
the use of the bridge institution tool, aiming to maintain the critical functions of the 
                                               
106 D. Freudenthaler and P. Lintner, ‘Conditions for taking resolution action and the adoption of a 
resolution scheme’ in World Bank Group, Understanding Bank Recovery and Resolution in the EU: a 
Guidebook to the BRRD (April 2017), Chapter 14, p. 106. 
107 Ibid., p. 107. 
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Press, 2016), para. 10.01. 
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failing bank.112 The temporary bridge institution (known as a bridge bank) is a legal 
entity, wholly or partially owned by one or more public authorities (resolution 
authority is included) and controlled by the resolution authority, to which all or some 
of the assets, rights, or liabilities of the failing bank are to be transferred.113 
 
(c) Asset separation tool 
By contrast to the aforementioned resolution tools, which can be applied either 
individually or in combination, the asset separation tool may only be applied in 
combination with another one.114 For the cleansing of a failing bank’s balance sheet of 
impaired (‘toxic’) assets, resolution authorities can rely on this tool, transferring the 
underperforming assets to an asset management vehicle (‘bad bank’), which is a legal 
entity, likewise in the case of the bridge institution tool.115 It must be noted that the 
asset separation tool may only be used with regard to assets, the liquidation of which 
under normal insolvency proceedings could have an adverse effect on financial 
markets, or where the transfer is necessary to ensure the proper functioning of the 
institution under resolution or bridge institution, or to maximize liquidation 
proceeds.116 
Although not a stricto sensu resolution tool, the write-down or conversion to shares of 
capital instruments at the point of non-viability (PONV) is a possibility that the 
resolution authorities have under the BRRD and which precedes bail-in.117 It applies 
upon determination by the resolution authority that the institution is failing or likely to 
fail and that there is no reasonable prospect that any action rather than the write 
down or conversion of capital instruments would prevent the failure of the institution 
within a reasonable timeframe.118 The first step is to write down Common Equity Tier 1 
(CET 1) capital in proportion to the losses. The second step would be the write-down of 
Additional Tier 1 (AT 1) capital instruments or their conversion into CET 1. If neither 
                                               
112 Deutsche Bundesbank, ‘Europe’s new recovery and resolution regime for credit institutions’, Monthly 
Report, June 2014, 31, 38; M. Hormaeche Lazcano, ‘The Bridge Institution Tool (Bridge Bank) in World 
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117 BRRD, Art. 59. 
118 BRRD, Art. 59(4). 
 
 
 -21- 
this is enough to achieve the resolution objectives, a third step would be to write down 
Tier 2 capital or convert it into CET 1 instruments.119 Despite the structural similarities 
to the bail-in tool, the above-mentioned options do not constitute resolution tools in 
the narrow sense, since the underlying liabilities were issued as subordinate, loss-
absorbing instruments from the outset.120 
 
(d) Bail-in tool 
Bail-in121 is the most innovative of the tools that the resolution authorities have at 
their disposal in the context of BRRD.122 Instead of being imposed on taxpayers (‘public 
bail-out’), losses are allocated to shareholders and to unsecured and uninsured 
creditors, a key element introduced by the FSB reform agenda.123 It is, by definition, a 
process that applies to some but not all of its senior creditors (some of them must be 
protected) and the essence of which is the idea that some senior creditors should, in 
certain circumstances, have part of their claim against the bank, wholly or in part, 
written down after the write-down of lower ranking subordinated claims and equity. 
As Gleeson explains, such senior creditors may be granted new shares in the bank, but 
the claims of subordinated creditors may simply be annihilated.124  
With regard to its uses, the bail-in tool enables the resolution authorities to 
recapitalise an ailing institution to the extent sufficient to restore its ability to comply 
with the conditions for authorisation. They may further apply it in order to reduce the 
principal amount of, or convert into equity, claims or debt instruments that are 
transferred either to a bridge institution or under the sale of business tool or the asset 
separation tool.125 
Its scope is very broad and covers all liabilities that do not fall under any of the 
exceptions provided for by the BRRD. Specifically, liabilities excluded are the following: 
covered deposits; secured liabilities including covered bonds; liabilities arising from the 
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holding of client assets or client money or from a fiduciary relationship between the 
institution and another person; liabilities owned to other institutions with an original 
maturity of less than seven days; liabilities owed to a clearing or settlement system 
with a remaining maturity of less than seven days; liabilities owed to employees,  
commercial or trade creditors as well as tax and social security claims, provided that 
those liabilities are preferred under the applicable law; and contributions owed to 
deposit guarantee schemes.126  
In exceptional circumstances, where the bail-in tool is applied, the resolution authority 
may exclude certain liabilities from the application of the write-down or conversion 
powers where: it is not possible to bail-in that liability within a reasonable time; the 
exclusion is strictly necessary and is proportionate to achieve the continuity of critical 
functions and core business lines and to avoid giving rise to widespread contagion; or 
where the application of the bail-in tool would cause a destruction in value.127 
Taking into consideration the fact that a bank under resolution will have a large variety 
of instruments that could be used to absorb losses, the BRRD provides that the loss 
absorption order is aligned with the priority prescribed in normal insolvency 
proceedings.128 Shareholders are the first to bear losses and creditors follow thereafter 
in the priority applicable under general insolvency law.129 It is noteworthy that equity 
must have already been written down (loss absorption in full) before any debt 
instrument is subject to bail-in.130 
The need to ensure that failing institutions dispose of sufficient bail-inable instruments 
at all times, so as to enable an effective bail-in and an orderly resolution, led to the 
establishment of the minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities 
(MREL).131 This new regulatory ratio, similar to the total loss-absorbing capacity (TLAC) 
concept, which was introduced by the FSB,132 is expressed as a percentage of the total 
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liabilities and own funds of the institution, the numerator of which is comprised of 
own funds and MREL-eligible liabilities.133  
Institutions must at all times meet the MREL, which is set by the resolution authorities, 
after consulting the competent authority, individually for each bank on a case-by-case 
basis, since the BRRD provides no harmonised minimum level.134  The assessment 
criteria for the determination of the MREL will be further specified by the EBA.135 It 
should be noted that the setting of the MREL and the verification that the institutions 
maintain the required minimum aggregate amount form part of the resolution 
planning.136 
Not all bail-inable liabilities, though, are MREL-eligible. MREL should be composed of 
liabilities, which fulfil the following criteria: are issued and fully paid up; are not owed 
to, secured by or guaranteed by the institution itself; the purchase of the instrument 
was not funded directly or indirectly by the institution; have a remaining maturity of at 
least one year; do not arise from a derivative; do not arise from a deposit which 
benefits from preference in the insolvency hierarchy.137 
Nonetheless, it should be noted that according to Avgouleas and Goodhart the bail-in 
process may also have some significant disadvantages over bailouts. They stress that 
bail-ins may be more contagious and procyclical, more litigious, slower and more 
expensive as a process, requiring greater subsequent liquidity injections.138  
 
(e) Government financial stabilisation tools 
In the event of a systemic crisis, the government financial stabilisation tools may be 
applied by the government or the ministry of finance in consultation with the 
resolution authority.139 The public equity support tool140 and the temporary public 
ownership tool141 are, in effect, government bail-outs sanctioned by the BBRD. Taking 
                                               
133 BRRD, Art. 45(1); G. Merc ‘Resolution Planning’ in World Bank Group, Understanding Bank Recovery 
and Resolution in the EU: a Guidebook to the BRRD (April 2017), Chapter 11, p. 83. 
134 BRRD, Art. 45(6). 
135 BRRD, Art. 45(2). 
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137 BRRD, Art. 45(4). 
138 C. Goodhart and E. Avgouleas, ‘A Critical Evaluation of Bail-ins as Bank Recapitalisation Mechanisms’, 
Centre for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper10065 (July 2014), online at 
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into account that they contradict the objectives set under the Directive (avoidance of 
the use of public funds), they should only be used as a last resort after all other 
resolution tools have been exploited to the maximum extent practicable.142 
Finally, it is noteworthy that the interference in the property rights of shareholders 
and creditors which derives from the application of the above-mentioned resolution 
tools is justified by the overriding need to intervene in the ‘’public interest’’, while 
legal safeguards provided for by the BRRD ensure that their use has not been 
improper.143   
(3) Cross-Border Group Resolution 
The BRRD takes into consideration the cross-border nature of some banks and 
addresses the issue of cross-border group resolutions as regards co-ordination and co-
operation, when more than one Member States144 or third countries145 are involved. 
National resolution authorities under the guidance of the group resolution authority 
ensure that resolution tools are coherently applied across different         
jurisdictions.146  
Established around the core of existing supervisory colleges,147 resolution colleges are 
required to provide a framework for the group-level resolution authority and the 
participating authorities that includes the relevant tasks, which are to be performed. 
Exchanging information in respect of or developing group resolution plans, assessing 
the resolvability of groups, setting the minimum requirements of eligible liabilities or 
coordinating the use of financing arrangements are only some of the tasks of the 
resolution colleges, which may also be used as fora to discuss any relevant       
issues.148  
European resolution colleges must be established, where a third country institution or 
third country parent undertaking has Union subsidiaries or maintains significant  
                                               
142 Deutsche Bundesbank, ‘Europe’s new recovery and resolution regime for credit institutions’, Monthly 
Report, June 2014, 31, 37. 
143 BRRD, Arts. 73-80; G. Merc ‘Resolution Planning’ in World Bank Group, Understanding Bank Recovery 
and Resolution in the EU: a Guidebook to the BRRD (April 2017), Chapter 20. 
144 BRRD, Arts. 87-92. 
145 BRRD, Arts. 93-98. 
146 European Commission, EU Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD), Frequently Asked 
Questions, Press Release 15 April 2014. 
147 BRRD, Preamble, Recital (96). 
148 BRRD, Art. 88. 
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branches, established in two or more Member States.149 Their tasks are similar to 
those performed by the resolution colleges and, provided that there are other groups 
or colleges carrying out the same functions, the requirement to establish a European 
resolution college may be waived by mutual agreement of all the relevant parties.150 
(4) Resolution financing arrangements 
Bank resolution financing refers to the allocation of losses, incurred or future, and is 
necessary for the purpose of achieving the resolution objectives, mainly in order to 
maintain critical bank functions and to preserve financial stability.151 In the case of the 
bridge institution tool, for instance, the resolution authorities will need capital or 
short-term loans to be able to operate. The funds needed should not come from 
national budgets. Instead, it should be the financial industry as a whole that finances 
the stabilisation of the financial system.152 In order to be fair, the contributions will be 
calculated on the basis of the degree of credit, liquidity and market risk incurred by the 
institutions, incentivising thus the latter to operate under a less risky model.153 
To this end, the BRRD creates a European System of Financing Arrangements, 
comprised of national financing arrangements, borrowing between national financing 
arrangements and the mutualisation of national financing arrangements in the case of 
a group resolution.154 Within this system, Member States are required to establish 
their national financing arrangements through a fund, the use of which may be 
triggered by their resolution authorities.155 The minimum target level of these 
financing arrangements must, by 31 December 2024, reach at least 1% of the amount 
of covered deposits of all the institutions authorised in their territory.156  
Either through ex ante (raised at least annually) or through extraordinary ex post 
contributions and, where necessary, borrowings or other forms of support from 
financial institutions and other third parties157 (hierarchy of funding resources)158 the 
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152 BRRD, Preamble, Recital (103). 
153 BRRD, Preamble, Recital (107).  
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national resolution funds must be financed and further used only to the extent 
necessary to ensure the effective application of the resolution tools,159 but not to 
directly absorb losses or recapitalise a failing institution.160 Indirectly, losses may be 
passed on to the resolution fund, where, for instance, contributions made to a bridge 
bank cannot be fully recouped through the sale of the bridge.161 In this respect, the 
Directive provides that at least 8 % of the total liabilities (including own funds) of a firm 
in resolution must be exposed to loss first.162   
As of 2016 national resolution funds within the euro area have been replaced by the 
Single Resolution Fund (SRF) owned by the Single Resolution Board (SRB).163 During an 
eight-year transitional period national contributions will still be held in national 
compartments. The SRF will take over as a fully centralised fund thereafter.164  
(5) Use of Deposit Guarantee Funds in the context of resolution 
Apart from the resolution funds, international standard-setters include deposit 
guarantee schemes (DGS) in the pre-established funding mechanisms that will provide 
the necessary resolution financing.165 As it will be examined in the subsequent 
Chapter, DGS are designed to compensate depositors in the case of a bank’s 
liquidation. They may also be used to preserve depositors’ access to covered deposits 
with respect to national insolvency proceedings other than a direct pay-out.166  In the 
case of a bank resolution, the BRRD stipulates that the DGS may further be used to 
finance the resolution of credit institutions, provided that the resolution action 
ensures depositors’ continued access to their deposits.167 The synergy between 
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Press, 2016), para. 12.30. 
162 BRRD, Arts. 101(2) and 44(5); N. Kleftouri, Deposit Protection and Bank Resolution, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2015), para 8.44. 
163 See Chapter II. 
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resolution and DGS becomes clear from the fact that when a resolution framework 
that limits contagion is in place, the number of bank failures is reduced and 
consequently the likeliness of DGS-payouts.168   
The Directive distinguishes between the cases, whether the bail-in tool or other (than 
the bail-in) resolution tools are applied. In the first case, the DGS is liable for the 
amount by which covered deposits would have been written down in order to absorb 
the losses in the institution, had covered deposits been included within the scope of 
bail-in.169 In the latter, the respective amount of liability encompasses the losses that 
covered depositors would have suffered under a hypothetical liquidation scenario.170  
In all cases, the BRRD provides that the liability of the DGS must not be greater than 
the amount of losses that it would have had to bear, had the institution been wound 
up under normal insolvency proceedings (net pay-out amount).171 Additionally, in 
order to limit the likelihood that the DGS may be depleted through the resolution 
financing, the BRRD sets a cap in respect of the DGS target level. In particular, the DGS 
must be liable for an amount equal up to 50% of the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) 
target level, which is equivalent to 0,8 % of the amount of the covered deposits of its 
members.172 A percentage higher than 50% may be set by the Member States, taking 
into consideration the specificities of their banking sector.173 
With regard to their ranking in the creditor hierarchy, the BRRD provides for a super 
preference of the DGS. More precisely, being subrogated to the rights and obligations 
of covered depositors together with covered deposits, the DGS have a rank ahead of 
eligible deposits from natural persons and micro, small and medium-sized enterprises 
that exceed the coverage level of €100,000, as well as of ordinary unsecured, non 
                                               
168 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
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preferred creditors.174  As Merc notes, this special treatment safeguards the funds of 
deposit guarantee schemes and enables them to compensate the depositors in the 
event that deposits become unavailable. At the same time, this high ranking reduces 
the likelihood of resolution financing through DGS and limits it only to the case, in 
which losses are high and the bank strongly deposit-financed.175 
Finally, the resolution and deposit insurance funds may either constitute a single 
financing arrangement, having the same administrative structure, or be created as 
separate financing arrangements.176 A question arises with regard to the first option 
and in the hypothetical scenario of the insufficiency of the available financial means. 
Rather than satisfying all the requests, priority will be given to the protection of 
covered depositors.177 
      C. The BRRD II 
On 23 November 2016 the European Commission presented its proposals to amend 
the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive as regards loss-absorbing and 
recapitalization capacity of credit institutions and investment firms178 and the ranking 
of unsecured debt instrument in insolvency hierarchy179.  
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1. Loss-absorbing and recapitalisation capacity of credit institutions and 
investment firms   
Taking into account the assessment 180 of the EBA, which is required under the BRRD to 
report to the Commission on the modalities of the MREL requirement,181 the 
Commission committed to revise the MREL by putting forward a legislative proposal in 
order to ensure its consistency with the standards developed by international fora.182    
With the general BRRD framework remaining valid and intact, this proposal aims at 
implementing the TLAC standard into EU law through its integration into MREL 
requirement.183 Avoiding duplication by applying two parallel requirements would help 
prevent unwarranted legal complexities and compliance costs.184 
Despite their similar regulatory objective, which is the enhancement of the 
effectiveness of resolution through the availability of sufficient bail-inable liabilities, 
conceptually they differ. In terms of their scope, the TLAC is addressed only to global 
systemically important banks (G-SIBs), whereas MREL applies to all banks in the EU (as 
covered under the BRRD). Moreover, the latter is expressed as a percentage of an 
institution’s total liabilities, including regulatory capital, and is not based only on the 
risk weighted assets (RWA) of an institution. By contrast to the MREL, which is set by 
the resolution authority on a case-by-case basis, there is a mandatory fixed minimum 
TLAC requirement.185  
In particular, the amended BRRD recognises the Single Point of Entry (SPE) and the 
Multiple Point of Entry (MPE) resolution strategies. By contrast to the latter strategy, 
under which more than one entity may be resolved, the SPE strategy provides for the 
resolution of only one group entity (usually the parent). The other group entities 
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(operating subsidiaries) are not put in resolution, but upstream their losses to the 
entity to be resolved.186 In line with the TLAC standard, the proposal deals with an 
external MREL requirement, applicable to resolution entities, and with an internal 
MREL requirement that applies to subsidiaries which are not resolution entities.187 
Furthermore, the measurement metrics of the MREL are aligned with those of the 
minimum requirement for G-SIIs as provided in the TLAC standard and, hence, the 
MREL should be expressed as a percentage of the total risk exposure amount and of 
the leverage ratio exposure measure of the relevant institution.188 Moreover, the 
modified BRRD introduces the concept of 'guidance', allowing resolution authorities to 
require institutions to meet higher levels of MREL, while addressing in a more flexible 
manner any breaches of those levels.189 With the view to ease compliance costs of 
banks where their liabilities are governed by the laws of third countries, it was 
necessary to introduce more flexibility in the contractual relationships of Union banks 
with third countries. This need for proportionality is addressed in respect of the 
contractual recognition of bail-in. The introduction of a waiver allows the resolution 
authority to exclude the obligation of institutions to include bail-in recognition clauses 
in agreements or instruments governed by third country laws, if it determines that this 
would not impede the resolvability of the bank.190 
2. The ranking of unsecured debt instruments in insolvency hierarchy 
In order to comply with the TLAC standard and the ‘subordination requirement’191 
deriving therefrom as implemented in the CRR and the BRRD, certain Member States 
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have amended their insolvency ranking of unsecured senior debt under their national 
insolvency law. In the absence of harmonised rules, though, such efforts entail 
significant divergences and, to a great extent, this inhomogeneity can further result in 
the unequal treatment of unsecured debt holders and creditors across the different 
jurisdictions.192 
The proposal aims at partially harmonising193 bank insolvency creditor hierarchy as 
regards the priority ranking of holders of bank senior unsecured debt, eligible to meet 
the BRRD rules and the TLAC standard on loss absorbency and recapitalisation capacity 
for banks. The existing class of senior debt is maintained, while a new asset class of 
‘non-preferred’ senior debt is created. The latter should only be bailed-in in resolution 
after other capital instruments but before other senior liabilities. Institutions may opt 
for the issuance of debt in both classes. However, it should be noted that only the 
'non-preferred' senior class is eligible for the minimum TLAC requirement or any 
subordination requirement that could be imposed by resolution authorities on a case-
by-case basis.194 
By contrast to the aforementioned one, this proposal has already been adopted.195  
     D. Conclusive remarks 
Following the global financial crisis, the European Union has kept pace with the 
developments taking place at international level, embarking on an extensive reform of 
its regulatory agenda as regards financial services. Normal insolvency proceedings 
proved to be inadequate to deal with failing banks taking into account the likeliness of 
cross-border contagion within the highly interconnected financial sector. Costly 
bailouts resulted in the creation of the so-called sovereign debt crisis, particularly with 
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reference to certain Member States of the Euro-area periphery, and thus, perpetuating 
the sovereign-bank diabolic loop. 
The adoption of the BRRD has definitely satisfied the need for harmonisation and 
coordinated action, representing a significant step towards a strong European 
resolution framework. Since prevention is considered to be the best kind of therapy, 
recovery and resolution planning along with the early intervention measures 
introduced by the BRRD can better deal at an early stage with any deficiencies and 
problems that may arise. Contrary to normal insolvency proceedings, which relate to 
already failed and not failing/likely to fail financial institutions, financial institutions 
under resolution (provided that the conditions are met) will be restructured and their 
viability restored, while their critical functions will be maintained and the financial 
stability preserved. This can undoubtedly contribute to the avoidance of spillover 
effects. Hence, it is deducted that preemptive measures, like those provided for by the 
BRRD, will help to prevent future systemic crises.  
With regard to the bail-in tool, the most innovative and thus heatedly debated 
element of the Directive, the BRRD intended to put an end to the taxpayers’ exposure 
to public debt. Allocating the losses to shareholders and creditors will limit the state 
aid required in the past and break eventually the vicious bank-sovereign circle. In order 
to answer the question whether bail-ins can be more contagious, slower and expensive 
over bailouts, one should take into account the proposal of the European Commission 
to amend the BRRD. The implementation of the FSB TLAC standard into EU law 
through its integration into the MREL requirement is expected to reduce unwarranted 
legal complexity and compliance costs created due to the application of two parallel 
requirements. Among the changes anticipated through the amendment of the creditor 
hierarchy is the reduction to a minimum of credit institutions costs of compliance with 
the subordination requirement, as well as any negative impact on their funding costs. 
Hence, in addition to new asset class of ‘non-preferred’ senior debt, the existing class 
of senior debt (which has the highest insolvency ranking among debt instruments and 
is less costly for credit institutions to issue than any other subordinated liabilities), is 
also maintained.196 
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Nonetheless, it must be underlined that the credibility of a resolution framework 
depends on its applicability. As Mark Branson notes, only through practical examples197 
can be determined whether the new arrangements, particularly bail-in, actually 
work198 and since the bail-in tool is yet rather untested, resolutions that took place 
before the entry into force of the BRRD cannot be used to draw conclusions about the 
effectiveness of resolution under a fully operational BRRD framework.199 
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III. The European Banking Union 
The ‘Banking Union’ stricto sensu has already been achieved via European regulation, 
namely the Directives and Regulations that constitute the set of common rules under 
which banks operate in the EU. In the absence of effective rules on cross-border crisis 
management and insolvency, this ‘’narrow’’ Banking Union was not complete, as 
evidenced by the financial crisis. A ‘broader’ Banking Union should go beyond 
regulation and comprise macro-and micro supervision, crisis management – including 
deposit insurance, resolution and insolvency – and the lender of last resort function.200 
Basically, the Banking Union can be defined as a set of institutions, establishing 
supranational competencies in respect of supervision and resolution of banks, along 
with a financing mechanism within the context of resolution and restructuring.201    
A. The Route towards the European Banking Union  
The idea to create a centralised European supervisory authority has not been newly 
conceived.202 However, it was only in 2012 that views supporting the centralisation of 
banking supervision, backed up by a single bank resolution authority and a single 
deposit insurance fund were clearly expressed. Christine Lagarde, the IMF’s Managing 
Director, pointed out that in order ‘’to break the feedback loop between sovereigns 
and banks, we need more risk sharing across borders in the banking system. In the 
near term, a pan-euro area facility that has the capacity to take direct stakes in banks 
would help. Looking further ahead, monetary union needs to be supported by stronger 
financial integration, which our analysis suggests be in the form of unified supervision, 
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a single bank resolution authority with a common backstop, and a single deposit 
insurance fund.’’203  In his introductory statement, Mario Draghi, President of the  
European Central Bank, acknowledged the negative feedback loop between banks and 
sovereigns and the problem that ‘’during good times, large banks work as European 
institutions, but in bad times fall on national shoulders. Ensuring a well-functioning 
EMU implies strengthening banking supervision and resolution at European level’’.204 
Jose Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission, stressed the necessity of 
moving towards a Banking – and a fiscal – Union, which ‘appears as a natural priority’, 
in order to reap the full benefits from deepening the Economic and Monetary 
Union.205 Herman Van Rompuy, President of the European Council, promoted the idea 
of creating ‘’an integrated financial framework, having two central elements, namely, a 
single European banking supervision and a common deposit insurance and resolution 
framework’’.206 
Three weeks after the BRRD proposal, the European political leadership affirmed the 
imperative character the coordinated action should have in order for the vicious circle 
between banks and sovereigns to be broken. Thus, the Commission was asked to 
present its proposals for a Single Supervisory Mechanism and the Council to ‘’consider 
them as a matter of urgency by the end of 2012.’’207 The first step was taken. 
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B. Objectives 
The primary and overarching objective was two-fold; namely, to break the doom loop 
between banks and sovereigns208 and to enhance the single monetary policy by 
stopping financial fragmentation and restoring the credit flows within the Eurozone.209  
Furthermore, at the most basic level, the objective210 was to create a ‘’level playing 
field for the European banking industry and to remove any national biases or 
supervisory forbearance,  preventing the hiding of bad assets – or even leniency – 
towards so-called ‘national champions’ ’’.211 Tackling the specific risks within the Euro 
area, where pooled monetary responsibilities have increased the possibility of cross-
border spillover effects in the event of bank crises212 as well as ensuring that 
taxpayers’ money will not be used in order to bail out banks213 were also 
acknowledged by European Regulators as goals of the proposed Banking Union. As 
Wagner argues, a fully-fledged banking union has also the potential to reduce systemic 
risk in the Eurozone.214  
However, the sceptical and critical voices among the scholars are not missing. Buch, 
Körner and Weigert note that a successfully implemented and fully operational 
Banking Union can contribute towards deeper financial integration. Yet, they identify 
several shortcomings of the legal framework of the Banking Union, which are rooted in 
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Beck (ed), Banking Union for Europe – Risks and Challenges, Centre for Economic Policy Research (2012) 
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the boundaries of European primary law, making the changes of the EU treaties 
necessary. Hence, the Banking Union is no panacea.215 Munchau goes even further and 
argues that, instead of having this ill-designed banking union, it should be better to 
have no banking union at all.216 Otero-Iglesias and Steinberg state that the future of 
the banking union – and of the Euro – depends on the capacity of European leaders to 
strengthen EMU with the necessary political institutions.217 Allen, Carletti and Gimber 
point out the likelihood that the ECB in its role as supervisor within the context of the 
SSM will treat failing banks more leniently than national supervisors, due to concerns 
about the risk contagion across the Eurozone and to the availability of its resources.218 
So, what is in real terms the Banking Union? A closer look at its components should at 
this point be taken.   
C. The Three Pillars  
Based on a novel institutional set-up, the Banking Union constitutes a highly 
centralised regime as regards the supervision and resolution of banks in the Euro area 
and beyond.219 Its regulatory framework comprises the Capital Requirements 
Regulation (CRR), the Capital Requirements Directive IV (CRD IV), the Bank Recovery 
and Resolution Directive (BRRD) and the recast Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive; 
namely, the Single Rulebook in banking, which is consistently applied across the 
Member States.220    
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As set out by the European Commission, the establishment of the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism was the first major step.221 Yet, a partial banking union is no better than no 
banking union at all.222 It cannot be considered as complete without a more 
centralised management of banking crises. To this end, "common mechanisms to 
resolve banks and guarantee customer deposits" were also referred to in the report by 
the Presidents of the European Council, the Commission, the Eurogroup and the 
European Central Bank of 26 June 2012 as further steps towards the completion of the 
Banking Union.223 The Single Resolution Mechanism has already been in place. On the 
contrary, a European Deposit Guarantee Scheme is yet to be completed. 
1. Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) 
Due to the restricted scope of this paper as set under its topic, the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism will be discussed less extensively compared to the other two pillars. Yet, its 
importance cannot be overlooked and, therefore, it warrants a particular mention. As 
Yves Mersch, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, aptly observes, ‘’SSM and 
SRM are like Siamese twins; they cannot survive without the other. A supervisor can 
only credibly do his job, if liquidation is possible without undue risks to financial 
stability. Conversely, the resolution mechanism must be able to rely on the well-
founded and impartial judgement of the supervisor before putting any funds at his 
disposal’’.224 
The SSM Regulation225 confers upon the ECB a number of tasks relating to the 
prudential supervision of credit institutions in the euro area and in other participating 
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Member States. The overarching aim is to contribute to the safety and soundness of 
the credit institutions within the Union and each Member State, safeguarding the 
stability of the financial system and the integrity of the internal market.226 The 
Member States of the Euro area are automatically members, while non-Euro area 
Member States can decide to participate in the SSM, entering into ‘close-cooperation’ 
arrangements with the ECB.227 The direct supervision of ‘significant banks’, 
representing almost 85 per cent of banking assets in the Euro area, is conferred upon 
the European Central Bank, which is also indirectly responsible for the supervision of 
less systemically important banks.228 In accordance with the Regulation, the ECB must 
carry out supervisory tasks in relation to recovery plans and early intervention, where 
a credit institution or group in relation to which the ECB is the consolidating 
supervisor, does not meet or is likely to breach the applicable prudential 
requirements.229 The planning and execution of the tasks conferred on the ECB will be 
fully undertaken by an internal body, the SSB, composed of its Chair and Vice Chair.230 
Further, they must be carried out independently from other EU institutions and 
separately from the tasks related to the monetary policy.231 
As Nieto notes, the economic rationale in the Banking Union is that full coordination 
via centralised prudential supervision in the SSM and resolution in the SRM would 
ensure the highest level of safety and soundness, since only this approach would 
minimise any potential negative externalities of cross-border banking.232 
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2. Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) 
As already mentioned in the previous chapter, the implementation of the FSB Key 
Attributes into EU law has been achieved through the BRRD and – as it will be now 
discussed – the Single Resolution Mechanism Regulation233.  These two pieces of 
legislation are complementary; the BRRD provides uniform rules for the whole EU 
single market, while the SRM Regulation sets out the institutional and funding 
architecture for the application of those rules in Member States participating in the 
Banking Union.234 Being an essential complement to the SSM for more integrated 
bank oversight and crisis management in the Banking Union, the SRM aims at putting 
in place a framework that allows for more efficient recovery and resolution of ailing 
banks with minimal costs to the taxpayer and the real economy.235 Concerning the 
interaction of the BRRD and the SRM, it should be further noted that the Directive 
comprises minimum harmonisation rules and, hence, it does not lead to centralisation 
of decision making, given that it leaves discretion to national authorities as regards 
the application of resolution tools and powers. Thus, inconsistent decisions by 
Member States are not to be excluded and may be particularly costly in the case, for 
instance, of resolution of cross-border groups.236 The SRM provides instead for an 
integrated decision-making structure aligning resolution under the SRM with 
supervision under the SSM.237 
With regard to its scope, the Regulation establishes uniform rules and procedures for 
the resolution of the entities238, established in the participating Member States, which 
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must be applied by the Single Resolution Board (SRB), together with the Council and 
the Commission and the national resolution authorities within the framework of the 
SRM. The SRM will be further supported by a Single Resolution Fund (SRF). 
Participating Member States are considered to be those falling within the scope of 
SSM.239              
The Single Resolution Board, which is the core of the SRM, constitutes a new EU 
agency.240 Like the ECB for the SSM,241 it is responsible for the effective and consistent 
functioning of the SRM.242 The Board is required to draw up the resolution plans and 
adopt all decisions in relation to resolution of the entities that are not part of a 
‘group’, and of groups that are considered to be significant in accordance with the 
SSM Regulation.243 Among its responsibilities for resolution planning the development 
of so-called ‘’living wills’’ is also included.244  With reference to its relation to the 
BBRD, the Regulation stipulates that, if the Board performs tasks and exercises 
powers, which, pursuant to the BRRD, are to be performed or exercised by the 
national resolution authority, the Board is considered to be the relevant national 
resolution authority for the application of both the SRM Regulation and the BRRD.245 
The Regulation provides that the national resolution authorities are mainly 
responsible for the less significant banks, while being required to assist the SRB in its 
task to draw the resolution plans as regards the banks directly supervised by the 
ECB.246 It is noteworthy that during the negotiations of the Regulation arose the 
question of whether the SRB should be the ultimate decision-making authority within 
the SRM. This complexity derived from the fact that the SRB constitutes an EU agency 
and not an EU institution. Hence, the Board alone cannot be entrusted with 
‘discretionary powers’ or make ‘policy choices, given that its scope is limited by the 
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well-established Meroni247 case law.248 In its ruling, the ECJ held that delegation of 
powers to EU agencies can only relate to clearly defined executive powers, the use of 
which must be entirely subject to the supervision of the Commission (Meroni 
doctrine). Thus, ultimate decision-making authority as regards the initiation of 
resolution proceedings rests with the Commission and the Council.249           
A similar issue arose in respect of the legal basis of the Single Resolution Fund, as 
argued by the Commission under its proposal for a SRMR,250 generating a heated 
debate. Although Article 114 TFEU was the legal basis for the creation of the SRB, this 
article was eventually considered to be inadequate, pursuant to Article 125(1) 
TFEU,251 for the establishment of an EU resolution fund that would mutualise the risks 
related to bank resolution across participating Member States.252 The solution was 
given through the enactment of the Intergovernmental Agreement ‘’on the transfer 
and mutualisation of contributions to the Single Resolution Fund.253 This Agreement 
establishes the modalities regarding the transfer of the national contributions to the 
SRF, as well as the conditions for their progressive merger in a single pool.254 The SRB, 
the owner of the SRF, may only use it in order to ensure the effective application of 
the resolution tools and exercise of the resolution powers.255 The contributions must 
be raised ex ante, reaching a target level of at least 1% of the amount of covered 
deposits of all banks authorised in all of the participating Member States by the end of 
a transitional period of eight years starting from 1 January 2016.256 Until the Fund 
reaches its specified target level, the contributions will be raised at national level and 
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further transferred to national compartments, into which the SRF remains divided. 
The merger of the raised funds will take place progressively in due time.257 The pool of 
resources available under any circumstances aims at avoiding any procyclical, 
destabilising effects of ex-post levies on other banks, particularly, in situations of 
systemic crises.258                   
Finally, it should be mentioned that the proposed amendment to the SRM Regulation, 
namely the SRMR II, which forms part of the legislative package, including 
amendments to the CRR, the CRD IV and BRRD, has not yet been adopted.259 
3. European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) 
The public policy rationales behind deposit insurance have usually been consumer 
protection and the enhancement of financial stability.260 Neither sound nor ailing 
banks dispose of enough liquid funds to redeem all of their deposits on the spot. This 
explains why they are particularly vulnerable to the risk of bank runs, if depositors lose 
confidence in their banks. A massive withdrawal of deposits at the same time could 
cause cracks in the edifice of the banking sector, jeopardising the financial stability. If, 
despite the high level of prudential supervision, the closing of a bank cannot be 
prevented, the respective Deposit Guarantee Scheme (DGS) reimburses depositors up 
to a certain ceiling (the ‘coverage level’).261                 
Therefore, deposit insurance and bank resolution interact with each other as 
alternative or complementary mechanisms. Given that a direct pay-off under a deposit 
guarantee scheme will take place only where a failing bank is closed and liquidated and 
depositors have no longer access to their deposits, bank resolution – under the BRRD 
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framework –  ensures the continuity of banking services through the organisation of an 
orderly failure, reducing thus the likelihood of a deposit pay-off.262  
a) The current European Deposit Insurance Framework  
The Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive (recast)263 was adopted in 2014 in an effort 
to set aside the shortcomings264 of the original Guarantee Schemes Directive265. Hence, 
the objective of the recast was to harmonise and simplify the Directive in order to 
improve protection of deposits, maintain depositor confidence, and strengthen the 
safety net266. It introduced new funding requirements for schemes in order to enable 
the DGS to fulfil their obligations towards depositors and to ensure faster access to 
deposits in the event of a bank failure, and financial stability.267           
In particular, the recast (hereinafter DGSD) provides that each Member State is 
required to establish one or more DGSs within its territory and that credit institutions 
must not take deposits, unless they are members of a scheme.268 Eligible for protection 
is almost every type of deposits. Few have been explicitly exempted, among which 
deposits made by other credit institutions on their own behalf and for their own 
account, deposits by investment firm and insurance undertakings etc.269 With regard 
to the coverage level, Member States must ensure a coverage of EUR 100 000 per 
depositor in the event that the deposits become unavailable. A higher (than 100,000€) 
protection is also introduced, but it relates to specific types of deposits and only within 
a limited time range.270 
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Furthermore, DGSs should have sufficient financial means in order to cover their 
potential liabilities. Contributions must be raised annually and reach by 2024 a target 
level of 0,8 % of the amount of the covered deposits of its members. Contributions 
raised in respect of resolution financing arrangements must not count towards the 
target level. The respective reduced target level must not be lower than 0,5% of 
covered deposits.271 The repayable amount must be made available within seven 
working days. However, Member States may, for a transitional period until 31 
December 2023, set the repayment period to 20 or 15 working days.272       
With reference to the use of DGS funds, the Directive has retained the primary ‘pay-
box-function’.273 In the aftermath of the financial crisis and following the global 
trend,274 the DGSD expanded the possible uses of the DGS funds, which now further 
encompass the use for alternative measures in to prevent a failure and the use to 
finance measures to preserve the access of depositors to covered deposits (financing 
of bank resolution).275   
With regard to the latter and within the context of bail-in resolution, it should be 
underlined that the DGS absorbs the losses that covered depositors would have 
absorbed, had covered deposits been included within the scope of bail-in and been 
written down to the same extent as creditors with the same level of priority under the 
national law governing normal insolvency proceedings.  A practical difficulty derives 
from the application of this rule. Given the super priority of covered depositors in the 
creditors’ hierarchy in case of insolvency, the extent of write-down cannot be easily 
determined, since no other creditor of the same priority would be subject to bail-in. 
Hence, the RA must define a hypothetical amount of bail-in for covered depositors in 
order to determine the amount of liability of the DGS.276 According to the subrogation 
principle, in the event that a DGS makes payments in the context of resolution 
                                               
271 DGSD, Art. 10. 
272 DGSD, Art. 8. 
273 DGSD, Recital(14) and Art. 11(1).  
274 ‘’Mandates can range from narrow “pay box” systems to those with extensive responsibilities, such 
as preventive action and loss or risk minimisation/management, with a variety of combinations in 
between’’. See International Association of Deposit Insurers,’ IADI Core Principles for Effective Deposit 
Insurance Systems’ (November 2014), online at 
https://www.iadi.org/en/assets/File/Core%20Principles/cprevised2014nov.pdf, accessed 7 January 
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275 DGSD, Art. 11. 
276 O. Aloupi, ‘The interaction of deposit insurance and bank resolution, in particular under the legal 
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proceedings, the Scheme has a claim against the relevant credit institution for an 
amount equal to its payments. That claim must rank at the same level as covered 
deposits under normal insolvency proceedings.277 
Whether the objectives set under the DGSD can be effectively reached remains 
questionable. As Gerhardt and Lannoo note, the Commission intended through the 
proposed amendments to address the problems raised by the crisis, as well as the 
recommendations of the experts in the ‘De Larosière Report’ for further 
harmonisation. According to the report, ‘’depositors should enjoy the same level of 
deposit protection in all member states, as the existing variety of DGS is considered 
unsustainable and unreliable in times of crisis’’. Yet, Gerhardt and Lannoo argue that 
the recast Directive cannot be considered as a sufficient response to the problems that 
arose during the crisis. Since many issues concerning the governance of DGS, the role 
of the Schemes as regards financial stability and their cross-border dimension have 
only been partially addressed, there is much scope for regulatory arbitrage, 
competitive distortions and moral hazard278 left. Thus, further harmonisation is 
required in order for an integrated financial market to be sustained.279  
b) The EU Commission Proposal for an EDIS 
In November 2015 the European Commission brought forward a legislative proposal, 
envisaging the establishment of a single European Deposit Insurance Scheme280 . It had 
already called in 2012 for a Banking Union that ‘’would place the banking sector on a 
more sound footing and restore confidence in the Euro as part of a longer term vision 
for economic and fiscal integration’’.281 So far, only the first two pillars have been 
                                               
277 DGSD, Art. 9. 
278 ‘’Moral hazard refers to the adverse effects, from the point of view of the insurer, which insurance 
may have on the insuree’s behaviour. Moral hazard incentives may relate to bank managers, 
shareholders, depositors, other creditors, or other stakeholders. Banks insured against are the most 
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should the risk taking prove to be successful, then management and shareholders will benefit, directly, 
but should the bank fail, it will be the deposit protection scheme that will have to pay compensation to 
depositors.’’ N. Kleftouri, Protection and Bank Resolution, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), para. 
2.09. See also, N. Kleftouri, ‘Deposit insurance system and moral hazard, J.I.B.L.R. (2013), 271-278.  
279 M. Gerhardt and K. Lannoo, ‘Options for reforming deposit protection schemes in the EU’, ECRI Policy 
Brief 4 (March 2011), online at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2001374, accessed 8 December 2018, p. 2. 
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established, whereas the third one is still to be completed. Yet, it was the Five 
Presidents' Report282, which brought the creation of the European Deposit Insurance 
Scheme (EDIS) back onto the political agenda. 
In the Banking Union, deposit insurance remains purely national. Consequently, DGSs 
are susceptible to large local shocks. Given that the underlying proposed Regulation 
builds on the existing framework of the DGS Directive, 283 it is of importance, any 
significant differences across Member States in respect of the implementation of the 
Deposit Guarantee Scheme Directive rules (for instance, regarding the conditions to 
declare deposits unavailable, the eligibility of deposits, the financing of Deposit 
Guarantee Schemes or the use of Deposit Guarantee Scheme funds) to be set aside. 
Through greater harmonisation, the EDIS would enhance stability in the banking sector 
by providing strong and uniform insurance coverage for all its depositors, irrespective 
of their geographical location within the Banking Union.284 
The scope of the EDIS, which corresponds to the scope of the DGSD, will include every 
deposit-taking bank established in the Banking Union.285 Currently, each Member State 
has a deposit guarantee scheme in place, as required by the DGSD.286 National DGSs 
would continue to co-exist alongside EDIS, which will be established in three 
subsequent stages. In particular, under the re-insurance scheme, which is proposed to 
apply for three years until 2020, EDIS may provide limited funding, and cover a limited 
share of the loss of a participating DGS that encounters a payout event or has been 
requested to contribute to resolution.287 The second phase would be a co-insurance 
scheme, applying for four years until 2024. In the event of a pay-out or resolution 
procedure, participating DGSs may request both funding and loss cover as from the 
“first euro” and the share borne by EDIS would gradually increase over the co-
                                               
282 European Commission, The Five Presidents’ Report, ‘Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary 
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accessed 10 January 2019. 
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insurance period.288 In the final stage, the full insurance, deposits would be fully 
insured and EDIS would cover all liquidity needs and losses in the event of a pay-out or 
resolution procedure.289 
The proposed Regulation, building on the existing framework of the DGSD, provides 
the Single Resolution Board with decision-making, monitoring and enforcement 
powers relating to EDIS.290 Participating DGSs have the duty to notify the Board 
without delay once they become aware of circumstances that are likely to result in a 
payout event or a request from the resolution authority to contribute to resolution.291 
The Board would decide within 24 hours whether the conditions for EDIS support have 
been met and determine the amount of funding that would be provided.292 Following 
the provision of funding in case of a payout event, the Board would closely monitor the 
payout and the insolvency procedure of the credit institution concerned.293 
c) The US Paradigm  
A look across the Atlantic would answer the question whether it is feasible for 
deposit insurance and resolution to be combined under a single institution. The 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), formed in 1933 following the bank 
failures of the Great Depression, has primarily the mandate to provide deposit 
insurance to depository institutions that qualify for insurance coverage under the 
Federal Deposit Act.294 The FDIC pays off depositors of failed banks out of the 
Deposit Insurance Fund and may serve as receiver or conservator for failed 
depository institutions.  
According to the Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA) introduced by the Dodd-Frank 
Act, the FDIC may further act as receiver for financial companies that are proved to 
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be risky for the US financial stability. In its role as receiver or conservator, the FDIC 
may be categorised as the resolution authority, acting in accordance with the ‘least-
cost’ principle.295 It is the manager of the Orderly Liquidation Fund, which constitutes 
a separate fund in the US Treasury, remaining inactive and unfunded until the 
appointment of the FDIC as receiver for a covered financial company.296 Apart from 
the ‘two separate-funds model’, a single fund may also be established, comprising 
both the deposit insurance and the resolution fund. In the latter case, it must be 
ensured that the available financial means are sufficient to cover all liabilities 
deriving therefrom.297  
In a nutshell, the mission of the FDIC has been the insurance of deposits, the 
examination and supervision of financial institutions for safety and soundness and 
consumer protection, the resolution of large and complex financial institutions, and 
the management of receiverships.298   
D.  Conclusive remarks   
To conclude, a question is reasonably raised: is there a need for a third pillar? The 
opinions expressed have been many and various and the academic discussion lively. 
Gerhard and Lannoo stress that only a single pan- European fund, which would replace 
existing DGS, would deliver the solution to many challenges that the networks 
structure or ‘28  regime’ (co-existence of DGSs and of the EDIS) cannot deal with 
adequately.299 Gordon and Ringe advocate that a banking resolution pillar 
strengthened through the ‘self-insurance’ approach would render the third pillar 
unnecessary, yet the Banking Union operational and less dependent on ‘state’ 
insurance. In view of the political deadlock, a self-insurance resolution mechanism 
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would constitute a viable solution.300 Deposit insurance and resolution are in principle 
separate functions.301 Yet, recognising the interrelation between them, Gros and 
Schoenmaker have proposed the creation of a European Deposit Insurance and 
Resolution Authority (EDIRA), by analogy to the role of the FDIC in the US.302 In the 
same direction, Colaert stresses that the concept of a separate pan-European DGS 
should be considered outdated before it has ever been implemented. A combination 
of a resolution and deposit guarantee fund for the Eurozone would be the way 
forward.303  
Despite the divergence of the aforementioned opinions, it is deducted that the 
common denominator remains the trend towards a centralised Deposit Insurance 
Fund, given that the national DGSs cannot ensure a homogenous deposit protection 
throughout the EU. Full harmonisation is necessary more than ever. The third pillar 
needs to be established. Only a fully-fledged Banking Union with all three pillars will 
deliver its full potential as part of a strong Economic and Monetary Union.  
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IV. Conclusions 
Bank failures – and future financial crises – could decisively be prevented, provided 
that strong resolution frameworks are in place. The adoption of the BRRD has been, 
undoubtedly, a significant step towards this direction.  
It provides uniform rules for the whole EU single market and constitutes the legal 
harmonized framework, upon which the Single Resolution Mechanism, the second 
pillar of the European Banking Union is based. Given that the Directive comprises 
minimum harmonisation rules, it does not lead to centralisation of decision making. 
Hence, it leaves discretion to national authorities as regards the application of 
resolution tools and powers, resulting in inconsistent and costly decisions. The SRM 
provides, instead, for an integrated decision-making structure aligning resolution 
under the SRM with supervision under the Single Supervisory Mechanism. 
What is more, deposit insurance and bank resolution interact with each other as 
alternative or complementary mechanisms. Given that a direct pay-off under a deposit 
guarantee scheme will take place only where a failing bank is closed and liquidated and 
depositors have no longer access to their deposits, bank resolution – under the BRRD 
framework –  ensures the continuity of banking services through the organisation of an 
orderly failure, reducing thus the likelihood of a deposit pay-off. 
Taking into account the interconnectedness of bank resolution and deposit insurance, 
it should be noted that a fully centralised and integrated resolution framework (BRRD 
– SRMR) makes evident the need for a fully harmonised deposit insurance protection 
system. Therefore, the third missing pillar of the Banking Union should be completed 
as soon as possible in order for the Banking Union to be able to deliver its full 
potential.   
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